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REVERSE STOCK SPLITS AND SQUEEZE-OUTS:
A NEED FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Reverse stock splits' permit direct and relatively inexpensive elimina-
tion of minority shareholders in public or closely-held corporations. In
public corporations, this technique allows the majority to achieve private
status.2 When controlling shareholders hold sufficient power to effectu-
ate such corporate change, however, the possibility of minority oppres-
sion arises.3 Minority shareholders squeezed out by means of a reverse
stock split have challenged the majority's action as a breach of fiduciary
duty. Courts have tested the majority's use of a reverse stock split
against various standards. To uphold its use, some courts require the
1. A reverse stock split is "the conventional stock split in reverse - instead of a company
amending its charter so as to have more shares authorized and outstanding, the charter is amended
so as to reduce dramatically the authorized and outstanding shares." Dykstra, The Reverse Stock
Split-That Other Means of Going Private, 53 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1, 3 (1976). See infra notes 8-11
and accompanying text. See also Lawson, Reverse Stock Splits: The Fiduciary's Obligations Under
State Law, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1226 (1975) (specifically discussing reverse stock splits).
2. A "going-private" transaction is a transaction designed to terminate public stock ownership
and return the corporation to closely-held status. Brudney & ChireIstein, A Restatement of Corpo-
rate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1365 (1978). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
defines a going private transaction as one designed to reduce the number of equity security holders to
less than 300 or cause such securities to be delisted from a national securities exchange or associa-
tion. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3) (1985) (regulating going private transactions). See generally Bor-
den, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Brudney, A Note
on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
Other methods allow majority shareholders to eliminate the minority. A short-form merger, for
example, permits the parent company, as majority shareholder holding a certain percentage of stock,
to merge with a subsidiary without shareholder approval. Minority shareholders are cashed out in
the process. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.05
(2d ed. 1985); Weiss, The Law of Take-out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624
(1981). A long-form merger can accomplish the same result. In a long-form merger a parent corpo-
ration not holding sufficient stock to effectuate a short-form merger merges with a subsidiary. See,
e.g., Tanzer v. International General Indus. Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (parent merged with an
81% owned subsidiary and cashed-out minority shareholders). See generally O'NEAL & THOMP-
SON, supra, at § 5.04. Finally, the majority can make a tender offer for the shares of the minority.
3. See, eg., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 111, 460 P.2d 464, 473, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 601 (1969)(noting that the minority is in an "often precarious position," and vulnerable to
the "vagaries of the majority"); Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill.2d 452, 456-57, 322
N.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1974) (reviewing history of the concerns about minority protection and recogniz-
ing the potential harm of freeze-outs), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975); Leader v. Hycor, Inc.,
395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173, 177 (1985) (noting the possibility of harm to minority interests). See
generally F. O'NEAL, 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 8.07, 8.08 (2d ed. 1971) (arguing that minority
shareholders in close corporations are extremely vulnerable to the majority's control).
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majority shareholders to establish a compelling business purpose.4 Other
courts require only that a legitimate business purpose support the major-
ity's actions.' Reverse stock splits pose different risks to minority share-
holders in public as opposed to close corporations 6 in states that do and
do not recognize an appraisal remedy when this technique is used.' For
this reason, courts should consider such factors in establishing an appro-
priate standard of review.
This note examines reverse stock splits and the varying judicial ap-
proaches to their use. Part I explains the mechanics of this technique,
and highlights its associated advantages and disadvantages for majority
and minority shareholders. Part II analyzes the various judicial stan-
dards employed in testing its use. Finally, Part III advocates a compel-
ling business purpose standard and examines the application of this
standard in the context of public and close corporations.
I. REVERSE STOCK SPLITS
A reverse stock split is a relatively simple statutory process that per-
mits a corporate recapitalization.8 Most state corporate statutes provide
that a corporation may amend its articles of incorporation to increase or
decrease the authorized number of shares or to reclassify or cancel all or
part of its share.9 Assume, for example, that five shareholders each hold
15,000 shares. Another 15,000 shares are distributed among 200 share-
holders. By amending the corporate charter,"0 the five majority share-
holders can recapitalize the corporation and call for a 15,000 to 1 reverse
stock split. Each controlling shareholder will retain one new share, with
each minority shareholder retaining only a minute fraction." The ma-
4. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. A "close" corporation is one whose shares
are not generally traded in the securities market. O'NEAL, supra note 3, at § 1.02.
7. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
8. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1983) (authorizing corporation to purchase, re-
deem, exchange or otherwise deal in its shares); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.03 (1984)
(hereinafter cited as Model Act) (allowing "reacquisition, redemption, or conversion of outstanding
shares").
9. Lawson, supra note 1, at 1227.
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1983) (requiring majority vote to amend
articles of incorporation); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 71 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979) (requiring
two-thirds vote of each class to amend articles).
11. One share would be split among the 200 shareholders. See generally O'NEAL & THOMP-
SON, supra note 2, at § 5.10; Dykstra, supra note 1, at 3-4 (citing other numerical examples).
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jority can then take advantage of statutory cash-out provisions 2 and
cause the corporation to repurchase the outstanding fractional shares.
The majority remains in control of a recapitalized closely held corpora-
tion. The process strips minority shareholders of their shares with the
controlling shareholders determining the fractional-share repurchase
price.
A. An Attractive Alternative
A reverse stock split provides an attractive method for eliminating the
minority shareholders of a closely held or public corporation. In order to
eliminate the minority, the majority shareholders of a close corporation
need only hold enough votes to pass a charter amendment."3 Although
gathering the necessary votes poses some difficulty in a public corpora-
tion," a reverse stock split provides advantages over other methods
within its repertoire of going private techniques.15
For a public corporation majority, a reverse stock split offers the ad-
vantages of certainty and finality in the elimination of minority interests.
After shareholder amendment of the certificate of incorporation, the di-
rectors merely set a price at which the corporation will repurchase the
outstanding shares.16 Unlike a tender offer, which may not attract
enough minority shares to complete the desired squeeze-out, there is no
12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 155 (1983) which provides:
A corporation may, but shall not be required to, issue fractions of a share. If it does not
issue fractions of a share, it shall (1) arrange for the disposition of fractional interests by
those entitled thereto, (2) pay in cash the fair value of fractions of a share . . . (3) issue
scrip or warrants. . . which shall entitle the holder to receive a full share upon the surren-
der of such scrip or warrants aggregating a full share ...
See also MODEL AcT, supra note 8, at § 6.04 (provisions similar to Delaware). See generally Law-
son, supra note 1, at 1227 (discussing statutory provisions facilitating reverse stock splits).
13. See supra note 10.
14. The number of shareholders in a public corporation is necessarily larger than in a close
corporation. In addition, if proxies are sought, sufficient information must be disseminated to satisfy
the securities laws. See infra note 25.
15. See Dykstra, supra note 1, at 4-10 (summarizing advantages of reverse stock split to public
corporation). But see Robinson, Elimination of Minority Shareholders, 61 N.C.L. REv. 515, 516
(1983) (arguing that mergers are more readily accepted and approved because of the complex nature
of reverse stock splits).
16. The corporation is not free to set a grossly insufficient repurchase price. Minority share-
holders may have the right to an appraisal remedy under state law. See infra notes 32-39 and accom-
panying text. In addition, courts have required that the minority receive a "fair price" in a going-
private transaction. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (discussed infra note
82).
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1
need for a "mop-up" technique." Second, a reverse stock split provides
a comparatively inexpensive means of going private.' 8 The majority need
not offer a premium in excess of the current market price required in a
tender offer to attract the minority's shares. 19 Finally, a public corpora-
tion employing a reverse stock split avoids the legal and accounting fees
necessary to draft agreement statements and Security Exchange Commis-
sion documents required for mergers and tender offers.2°
B. Costs and Minority Protections
A reverse stock split is not, however, without cost. The repurchase of
minority-held fractional shares affects the short-term financial position of
both public and close corporations. The corporation may have to expend
millions of dollars from its capital reserves to eliminate the minority.2'
In addition, only financially sound 2 corporations can successfully effect
squeeze-outs by way of reverse stock splits because corporation codes
prohibit repurchase if insolvency will result.23
Statutory protections granted minority shareholders impose additional
cost. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proxy regulations and
disclosure requirements24 are examples. To amend the corporate char-
17. Dykstra, supra note 1, at 7. A "mop-up" transaction may consist of a short-form merger or
tender offer designed to fully eliminate minority shareholders not reached in the original transaction.
A reverse stock split itself may be used as a mop-up technique following another form of going-
private transaction. See, e.g., Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill.2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54
(1974) (discussed infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text).
18. Dykstra, supra note 1, at 7-8.
19. Id. at 8. This results because of the "involuntary" nature of the reverse stock split with
respect to minority holders. Id.
20. Id. at 7-8. Submitting to shareholder vote a merger or other plan of acquisition, other than
a reverse stock split and other specifically excluded transaction, is deemed to be an "offer to sell" or
"sale" within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1985).
Consequently, a registration statement must be filed and a prospectus distributed before such trans-
actions may proceed. Securities Act of 1933, 17 U.S.C. § 77e (1985).
21. Dykstra, supra note 1, at 17. In Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173
(1985), the corporation paid out $5.00 a fractional share for 19% of the outstanding stock. This
required an expenditure of approximately S500,000. Id. at -, 479 N.E.2d at 174-5.
22. One article suggests that a corporation would not go private unless it foresees good times
ahead, preempting concerns about capital reserves. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 1369.
23. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)(1)(1983) (prohibiting purchase or redemption of
stock when "the capital of the corporation is impaired or when such purchase or redemption would
cause any impairment of the capital. . ."); MODEL Acr, supra note 8, at § 6.40 (prohibiting share
repurchase if corporation is unable to pay its debts or if its total assets would be less than its total
liabilities plus amounts needed to satisfy all preferential rights on dissolution).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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ter, a public corporation must prepare and disseminate the necessary
proxy materials.25  In addition, rule 13e-3 26 imposes substantial disclo-
sure requirements on going-private transactions. The corporation must
make extensive disclosures concerning the purpose of the transaction, the
alternatives considered and the effects on the shareholders. 27 Further,
the corporation must summarize all material reports, opinions and ap-
praisals prepared by legal and accounting sources,28 state whether the
corporation reasonably believes the transaction fair29 and disclose avail-
able remedies. 3° These requirements impose substantial cost in the form
of fees paid to appraisers, accountants, lawyers and printers.3 1
State appraisal right statutes where they provide a remedy for minority
victims of reverse stock splits also increase the costs of employing this
technique. Such statutes grant shareholders the right to dissent from a
proposed corporate activity and obtain payment for their shares.32 If the
shareholder is dissatisfied with the payment offered, he may notify the
corporation of his estimate of fair value.33 In the event of disagreement,
a court determines the fair price.34
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1985) (authorizing SEC to issue regulations covering proxy materials); 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 - 14a-12 (1985) (regulating proxy solicitations).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985). Rule 13e-3 also defines as fraudulent, deceptive or manipula-
tive any stated activity by an issuer in connection with a going-private transaction. Id. at § 240.13e-
3(b). See Mellman v. Southland Racing Corp., 575 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d
180 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that corporation had not violated Rule 13e-3(b)). See generally Roths-
child, Going Private, Singer and Rule 13e-3: What Are the Standards for Fiduciaries?, 7 SEc. REG.
L.J. 195 (1979) (discussing 13e-3 standards); Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State
Remedies, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 796, 801-07 (1976) (discussing cases that author considers led to
requirements in Rule 13e-3).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 7 (1985) (Schedule 13E-3).
28. Id. at Item 9. If such opinion or appraisal relates to the fairness of the consideration, the
corporation must state whether the corporation or an outside source recommended the amount of
consideration and summarize the method used in arriving at the findings. Id.
29. Id. at Item 8. The material must discuss "in reasonable detail the material factors upon
which the belief. . . is based." Id. at Item 8(b).
30. Id. at Item 13(a). The issuer also must disclose whether an appraisal remedy is available.
Id. In addition, specific financial data concerning the issuer corporation must be furnished. Id. at
Item 14.
31. See Dykstra, supra note I, at 12.
32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983) (any stockholder who "has neither voted in
favor of the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in writing . . . shall be entitled to an
appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of his shares. . ."); MODEL AcT, supra note 8,
at § 13.02(a)(providing shareholder with right to "dissent from, and obtain payment of the fair value
of in shares" in the event of listed corporate actions).
33. See MODEL AcT, supra note 8, at § 13.28.
34. Id. at § 13.30. Under Delaware provisions, each shareholder wishing to take advantage of
his appraisal rights must notify the corporation prior to the merger or consolidation. DEL. CODE
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All states provide an appraisal remedy to shareholders squeezed out by
merger or consolidation, but none expressly authorizes appraisal in the
event of a reverse stock split.35 Some courts have implied, however, that
appraisal is available.3 6 In addition, the American Bar Association and
other commentators have urged the amendment of appraisal statutes to
address this situation.37 Even if the availability of an appraisal remedy is
assumed, the protection afforded close corporation minority shareholders
remains inadequate.38 Fair valuation of close corporation stock is ex-
tremely difficult because of the absence of a ready market for close corpo-
ration shares.3 9 Minority shareholders in close corporations, therefore,
must rely on the judiciary to protect their interests from majority
oppression.
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (1983). The shareholder and corporation do not have the opportunity, as
such, to reach an agreement on price. Rather, the court determines fair value for all wishing to
exercise appraisal rights.
35. See Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 831-32
(1984). But see Robinson, supra note 13, at 525 (noting that the 1983 revision of the Delaware
appraisal statute was meant to include reverse stock splits).
36. See Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. at _, 479 N.E.2d at 178-79 (court implies that the
lower court had used the appraisal statute); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87
Misc.2d 385, 387, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (1976) (courts may intervene where fraud or illegality
exists notwithstanding availability of appraisal remedies).
37. See MODEL Acr, supra note 8, at § 13.02(a)(4)(v) which provides for appraisal when an
amendment to the articles of incorporation "reduces the number of shares owned by the share-
holder to a fraction of a share if the fractional share so created is to be acquired for cash. . . ." See
also Lawson, supra note 1, at 1247-48 (urging the amendment of appraisal statutes to include reverse
stock splits).
38. See Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the "New"Appraisal Remedy, 62 WASH. U.L.Q.
415, 433 (1984). See also Comment, Recent Developments in the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1252, 1255-56 (1973) (appraisal is insufficient because it provides an
exclusive remedy, does not consider shareholder's desire to remain in the corporation, offers less
than true value for shares, provides an inadequate remedy for close corporation shareholders and
results in unfavorable tax consequences).
39. Thompson, supra note 38, at 433. Salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits, which signifi-
cantly affect earnings in a close corporation, influence value. Id. In addition, Professor Thompson
notes that close corporation shareholders may consider the corporation as more than a mere invest-
ment. Id. Accord Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1640 (1961).
An appraisal remedy, if available, is generally exclusive. This represents an additional deficiency.
Appraisal may result in a "minimum fair value" cash-out if the price received approximates the
lowest market value, excluding payment for potential future profits expected to result from the re-
verse stock split or merger. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964). But see Thompson, supra note 38, at 428 (suggesting that
judicial application of appraisal has created a standard providing the minority with "at least a por-
tion of the gain created by the transaction.").
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II. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF STOCK CONSOLIDATIONS
The first step in a reverse stock split, amending the corporate charter,
requires only majority approval." Courts have recognized that actions
requiring less than unanimous agreement present the possibility of dam-
age to minority interests. 4' Consequently, courts have held that control-
ling shareholders, like directors, owe a fiduciary duty to the minority.4 2
Judicial interpretations of this duty, while allowing management flexibil-
ity, prevent the majority from forcing minority shareholders to relinquish
their interests in the absence of a business purpose for the resulting
freeze-out. 43 Courts have adopted differing standards for analyzing the
business purposes offered by controlling shareholders as justifications for
their actions.
A. Deferential Standards
In several cases, courts have adopted a deferential approach to the
board of director's decision to employ a reverse stock split. Under this
approach, courts do not seriously examine the legitimacy of the business
purposes asserted by the directors. In Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co.,' the majority employed a 600 to 1 reverse stock split as a mop-up
technique following a tender offer.45 The majority justified the recapitali-
40. See supra note 10.
41. See supra note 3.
42. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). The Court stated that:
[the controlling shareholder] who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first
and his cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of his corporation to their detri-
ment and in disregard of the standards of common decency and honesty. . . . He cannot
utilize his inside information and his strategic position for his own preferment. He cannot
violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly through the corporation what he could not do
directly.
Id at 311. See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 585, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-15
(1975) (stating that the controlling group in a close corporation owes the minority substantially the
same fiduciary duty that partners owe one another); cases cited supra note 3.
43. The Pepper standard generally has been interpreted to prohibit unequal treatment and self-
dealing by the majority. See Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions
and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1091-98 (1983); O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 2,
at § 7.17 (discussing self-dealing - the use of a controlling position to augment the fiduciary's per-
sonal wealth). If self-dealing exists, courts usually require that the fiduciary demonstrate the inher-
ent fairness of the transaction. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983);
Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975). One commentator con-
cludes that all going-private transactions involve at least tacit self-dealing. Note, supra note 26, at
811,
44. 59 IIl.2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1954), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
45. Id. at 454, 322 N.E.2d at 55. Lincoln National Corp., the majority shareholder, offered
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zation as necessary to reduce expenses and simplify corporate proce-
dures." The plaintiff, a minority shareholder squeezed out during the
process, sought to retain her shareholder status.47 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that in the absence of a claim for fraud a stock reclassification
for the purposes stated did not violate the controlling shareholders' duty
to the minority. 48
In Cross v. Communication Channels, Inc. ,4 a closely-held corporation
used a reverse stock split to remove five percent of the minority share-
holders.5 0 The corporation followed this action with a short-form
merger that eliminated the remaining minority shares." The majority
justified its actions as necessary to save administrative costs, resolve con-
flicting shareholder desires for growth and dividend distribution, and rid
the corporation of a competing minority shareholder.5 2 The court ap-
proached the problem as a merger case and held that judicial interven-
tion is inappropriate unless the corporation fails to offer a valid business
purpose for its action. 3 Accepting the propriety of the purposes offered,
the court approved the majority's action.5 4
shares of its stock for that of Chicago Title. The tender offer netted 99.9% of the outstanding shares.
The reverse stock split resulted in 3722 shares outstanding with a par value of $4000 per share. Id,
46. Id. at 459, 322 N.E.2d at 58.
47. Id. at 453, 322 N.E.2d at 55.
48. Id. at 456-58, 322 N.E.2d at 57-58. The court noted that the statutes authorized stock
reclassification and cash-out of fractional shares. In addition, the court noted that the opportunity
existed to use the short-form merger statute to eliminate the minority. The court deferred to the
board's judgment and concluded that the actions of the majority were valid in the absence of a claim
of fraud or challenge to the business purpose. Id. One commentator argues that the court treated
the plaintiff's claim as analogous to a strike suit. Dykstra, supra note 1, at 20.
49. 116 Misc.2d 1019, 456 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
50. Id. at 1020, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1021, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 973. The plaintiff was an officer and principal shareholder of a
competing publication. All minority shareholders, except the plaintiff, accepted $3.25 per share for
their remaining fractional shares. Id.
53. Id. at 1022, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 974. The court noted that New York merger law allows
judicial intervention upon a showing of fraud or illegality, concealment or nondisclosure, breach of
duty, or inequitable dealing with minority holders in the absence of a valid business purpose. Id. at
1021, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 973 (citing Tanzer Economic Assoc. v. Universal Food Specialties, 87
Misc.2d 167, 176, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1976)). The plaintiff claimed his elimination from the corpora.
tion as inequitable, and the court examined the business purposes cited and stated that the business
judgments offered were independently sufficient. Id. at 1022, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
54. Id.
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B. The Heightened Business Purpose Test
In several cases, courts have applied a heightened level of review to
director decisions to use reverse stock splits. Under this approach,
courts require the directors to substantiate the business purposes they
assert. In Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., for example, a
New York appellate court confronted a corporate recapitalization involv-
ing a 4000 to 1 reverse stock split.56 The directors asserted that the elim-
ination of non-employee shareholders and the promotion of financial
statement confidentiality justified the consolidation." The court rejected
the purposes offered, and noted that only a "strong and compelling"
business purpose could justify a reverse stock split." The court further
stated that majority shareholders may not deprive the minority of its
shares when allegations of fraud, illegality, or bad faith are coupled with
a tenuous showing of corporate purpose.5 9
In Shivers v. Amerco, ° the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, re-
versed a summary judgment in favor of the directors on a claim alleging
breach of fiduciary duty.61 The corporation had effected a 100 to 1 re-
verse stock split for the asserted purpose of preventing purchases by un-
sophisticated investors who might rely on false or misleading
information. 62 The court remanded and directed the district court to de-
termine whether the majority had offered a compelling business purpose
for its action.63 The court noted that less drastic alternatives may have
been available and that the technique's disproportionate impact on the
55. 87 Misc.2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
56. Id. at 386, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
57. Id. at 391, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 665. The plaintiffs were former employees who had purchased
shares during their employment.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 390, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65. The court found that equitable intervention is proper
when the controlling group breaches its fiduciary duty and the minority sustains damage, even if the
corporation complies with the statutes. The court distinguished Teschner on this point, claiming
that the Teschner court had not found wrongdoing or improper purpose. Id. at 389, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
664. The court found that the asserted purposes lacked credibility because non-employees remained
shareholders after the action and the corporation had never issued financial statements. Id. at 391,
384 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
60. 670 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982).
61. Id. at 835.
62. Id. at 834.
63. Id. at 835. The court relied on Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson, I Cal.3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969), in which the California supreme court ruled that management actions injuring
minority shareholders are a breach of management's fiduciary duty unless a "compelling business
reason" is shown. Shiver, 670 F.2d at 833-34.
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minority may have been improper."r
C. The Hybrid Approach
In some cases, courts have purported to apply a heightened standard
of review but in practice failed to subject the asserted purposes to search-
ing scrutiny. In Leader v. Hycor, Inc., s the Massachusetts Supreme
Court addressed a minority shareholder's challenge to a 4000 to 1 reverse
stock split. The directors asserted that limited trading in, and the disap-
pointing market history of, the stock coupled with the absence of signifi-
cant dividends justified their actions.6 6 Citing Clark, the court noted the
potential for harm to minority shareholders that flowed from the direc-
tors' action.6 7 The court then placed the burden on the minority to prove
a breach of duty by demonstrating that less harmful alternatives were
available to achieve the desired result.68 Deferring to the lower court's
conclusion that the minority had not met this burden, the court easily
found the asserted purposes sufficient.69
IV. A NEED FOR HEIGHTENED COURT SCRUTINY
The differing approaches to the validity of reverse stock splits dis-
cussed above belie judicial uncertainty concerning the appropriate stan-
dard of review for such corporate acts. This Note proposes that courts
apply a two-part test to evaluate the legality of reverse stock splits. In all
instances, controlling shareholders must assert legitimate business pur-
64. Shiver, 670 F.2d at 833-35. The majority owed 94% of the stock. Following the reverse
stock split, the corporation offered to repurchase the fractional shares for 50% of book value and
prevented the minority from advertising stock in the company newsletter. Id. at 828. The plaintiff
established that the reverse stock split disproportionately affected minority shareholders by destroy-
ing the market for their shares while allowing the majority the opportunity to market their stock.
Id. at 833.
65. 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985).
66. Id. at -, 479 N.E.2d at 178.
67. Id. at -, 479 N.E.2d at 177.
68. Id. at , 479 N.E.2d at 177. The court followed Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
370 Mass. 842, 851, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976), a close corporation case where the court established
a two-part test: (1) did the majority demonstrate a legitimate business purpose; (2) if yes, did the
minority establish that the majority could achieve the same result through a less harmful alternative?
Leader, 395 Mass. at -, 479 N.E.2d at 177 (also citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367
Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975) (requiring the utmost good faith and loyalty)).
69. Leader, 395 Mass. at -, 479 N.E.2d at 178. The court also affirmed the lower court's
determination that Leader was a close corporation. The court, however, readily accepted the pur-
poses the controlling shareholders cited as supporting the action, which purposes are consistent with
public status. Id. See supra note 6 for a definition of a close corporation.
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poses to support the decision to employ this technique.70 Under the first
part of the proposed test, courts should balance the interests of the ma-
jority against the interests of and protections afforded the minority.71 If
minority interests are affected disproportionately and the court deems
existing protections inadequate, the proposed test requires that the ma-
jority justify its use of reverse stock splits with substantial and compel-
ling business purposes.72 The result of this initial balancing will differ
depending upon whether a public or a closely held corporation employs
the technique. In addition, the availability of an appraisal remedy will
affect the outcome of the balancing test.
A. Balancing Interests
Majority shareholder interests in flexible management and business
judgment, unencumbered by dissenting minority views, justify some dis-
crimination against the minority. Such discrimination is an inherent
consequence of minority status.73 The majority may, however, utilize
this flexibility to eliminate minority shareholders,74 thus threatening mi-
nority interests in continued shareholder status, future returns from the
enterprise, and the marketability and value of their shares.75
State law provides some measure of protection for minority sharehold-
ers' interests. Appraisal statutes are designed to ensure that the minority
receive fair value for their shares.76 However, because most state ap-
praisal statutes, at present, offer a remedy only in the event of mergers,
sales of assets and situations provided in the articles of incorporation, 77
70. A legitimate business purpose is any valid business purpose that the corporation asserts as
necessary. The proposed standard is similar to that adopted by courts applying a deferential stan-
dard to reverse stock splits. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
73. See Note, supra note 39, at 1646 (author also argues that a plaintiff challenging a freeze-out
should have the initial burden of showing the controlling gorup's actions as discriminatory). But see
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 1365-70; Note, supra note 26, at 811 (arguing that because of
the potential for unequal treatment or tacit self-dealing, all going-private transactions are
discriminatory).
74. See Thompson, supra note 38, at 433.
75. Various commentators have noted the potential for harm to minority interests in a freeze-
out. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 38, at 427 (loss of the option to participate in the new enter-
prise and reap future profits); Lawson, supra note 1, at 1235-38 (reduction in stock liquidity resulting
from decrease in the number of shares and increase in price of those remaining); Brudney, supra note
43, at 1095-98 (potential for undervaluing shares).
76. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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this protection may not be available. In addition, appraisal provides an
inadequate remedy for close corporation minority shareholders.78 There-
fore, even if the appraisal remedy becomes available in reverse stock
splits, it would weight the balance in favor of the majority only in the
context of challenges to actions by public corporations.
The federal securities laws also provide protection to the minority
shareholders in a public corporation. Rule 13e-379 and federal proxy reg-
ulations ° require disclosure sufficient for minority stockholders to vote
intelligently on necessary amendments to the articles of incorporation.8"
This information does not, however, guarantee fair value for repurchased
shares. In the absence of an available appraisal remedy, protections re-
main inadequate. When state statutes requires appraisal, courts may find
that sufficient protection exists to safeguard the interests of minority
shareholders in public corporations.82 In such a case, courts should hold
that the majority need only support its decision to employ a reverse stock
split by offering a legitimate business purpose.
B. Substantial and Compelling Business Purpose
In most instances, the initial balancing will suggest the existence of
substantial risks to minority interests. Under the second part of the pro-
posed test, courts then should require the majority to support its use of a
1
78. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to -12 (1985).
81. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. If the majority possesses the statutory requi-
site number of votes to pass the needed amendments, however, disclosure offers little value. Rule
lob-5 also offers minimal protection to public and close corporation minority shareholders in the
form of a prohibition on all fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1985). See generally O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at § 5.34.
82. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Weinberger involved a short-form
merger and cash-out of minority shareholders. Former minority shareholders challenged the action
as a breach of fiduciary duty. The court found that, in the absence of fraud, illegality or self-dealing,
appraisal provides sufficient protection of minority interests. Id. at 715. In Weinberger, the court
rejected a business purpose test in favor of an "entire fairness" test. Id. at 715. The first part of this
test encompasses a showing of "fair dealing," requiring informed voting by the minority. Id. at 711.
The court found that appraisal satisfies the second part of the test, "fair price." Id. For a discussion
of Weinberger, see Steinberg & Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U.L.Q.
351 (1984).
In the absence of appraisal, courts should presume that reverse stock splits inherently discriminate
against the minority. If the actions of a close corporation majority are at issue, the presence of
appraisal does not, however, offer sufficient protection. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text. Appraisal, therefore, should not tip the balance in favor of a close corporation majority.
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reverse stock split with substantial and compelling business purposes.8 3
This standard requires the majority to substantiate the justifications ten-
dered. The majority must show a nexus between its action and the as-
serted justifications and demonstrate that a less intrusive alternative was
unavailable.84
Under a substantial and compelling business purpose test, majority
shareholders cannot rely on a laundry list of potentially viable purposes.
The court should scrutinize the business reasons advanced in the context
of the particular facts of the case and accept only those purposes which
the court determines compel the action. Only those purposes which nor-
mally aid the profitability and efficiency of a viable corporation should be
accepted. 5 Because each corporation is unique, the same purpose may
not be compelling in all circumstances. The requirement of a compelling
business purpose, however, provides needed protection for minority
shareholders threatened by a reverse stock split.
V. CONCLUSION
A reverse stock split provides a relatively simple and direct method of
eliminating minority shareholders. The use of such a technique, how-
ever, may harm the interests of minority shareholders. State appraisal
statutes do not expressly encompass this technique and provide an inade-
quate assurance of fair value for squeezed-out close corporation minority
shareholders. In addition, federal regulation reaches only public corpo-
rations. This Note proposes a two-part test considering the protections
afforded. In most instances, this test would require that the majority
shareholders support their decision to use a reverse stock split with sub-
stantial and compelling business purposes. Judicial use of this test would
83. A substantial and compelling business purpose is any purpose that the majority substanti-
ates and the court finds compels the action. The proposed standard is similar to that adopted by
courts applying a heightened level of review to reverse stock splits. See supra notes 55-64 and ac-
companying text. Accord Note, supra note 39, at 1646-47; Lawson, supra note 1, at 1248-49 (arguing
for a compelling-business-purpose test if minority interests are disproportionately affected).
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Cross v. Communication Channels, Inc., 116 Misc.2d 1019, 456 N.Y.S.2d 971
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1982) (discussed supra notes 49-54). Cross exemplifies a fact pattern in which com-
pelling purposes supported the reverse stock split in a close corporation. The majority took the
action to rid the company of an "obstreperous" shareholder, who wished to retain his shareholder
status merely to aid his own company and bedevil the corporation. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON,
supra note 2, at § 2.11.
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ensure a proper balance between the interests of majority and minority
shareholders.
Michael R. Rickman
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/8
